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THE PRACTICE OF LAW BY
NON-LAWYERS
By Ambulance Chasers and Claim Adjusters*
By CHARLES L. AARONS**

T WILL, no doubt, be generally recognized that the evils arising
from the soliciting and settlement of personal injury claims, are to
be regarded primarily from other viewpoints rather than the one involved in the -title, for such solicitation is not law practice but is abhorrent to every right thinking lawyer. Effective attacks upon these
evils can and should be made by the application of remedies other than
the one which would bring certain of the activities which are incidental to the solicitor's work within the scope of law practice. Nevertheless consideration of the processes used by ambulance chasers and claim
adjusters, insofar as they encroach upon the province of the legal profession by engaging in the practice of law, is highly important to a profession which is -constantly-striving to uphold its standards.
Those who are not conversant with the details disclosed by the inquiry' conducted by the Circuit Court of Milwaukee County may not
fully realize the dominant influence which ambulance chasing organizations wielded in connection with claims for personal injuries. They occupied a commanding place in a field in which lawyers were, with few exceptions, -thesubordinates. In former years, where the practice of accepting solicited business existed, -the lawyer was considered essential and
still occupied first place in the mind of the client. The solicitor merely
brought the client to the lawyer's office and was satisfied to be the means
of bringing a case to the lawyer whereby he, the solicitor, would receive
some compensation for his efforts. But ambulance-chasing in its modern form has assumed larger proportions. It has become a distinct busi* This article is a revision of an address delivered by the writer on June
21, 1928, at Madison, Wisconsin, before the Wisconsin State Bar Association.

**Judge of the Circuit Court, Second Judicial Circuit Branch, No. 8, Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
'In re Petlition of Churchill, et al. (Inquiry begun April 11, 1927.)
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ness. The modem solicitor conducts an organization with tipsters and
assistants in various parts of the city and state. These assistants are
selected because of their nationality, their ability to speak the native language of the people in their section, and their influence. The solicitor
has a clientele which trusts him and spreads his reputation because of
his past success. Since he is regarded as a man having special knowledge
and experience in handling claims people come to him as they formerly
came to a lawyer. It is a mistake to suppose that every claim is directly
sought out by going to the home of the injured person. In many cases
the injured person or his friends seek out the well-known solicitor.
He or his assistant takes the statement with an eye to the legal effect of the facts disclosed. Advice as to whether the case is one of
liability and various other forms of advice, are freely offered with
the confident air of one who possesses seasoned experience. The
solicitor frequently assures the client that he possesses every facility
for handling and settling the claim without a lawsuit. Instead of
being a mere conveyor of business to a lawyer he performs the work
himself and employs the lawyer only as a last resort.
In the Milwaukee proceeding there was testimony to ,the effect that
about 90 per cent of the claims secured by solicitation were settled
without a trial; that 50 to 60 per cent of such claims were settled without the commencement of an action; that included in 'the 10 per cent of
cases which went to trial were formal settlements, approved in court,
of the claims of minors. It is natural to infer that when settlements
were made by the "chasers" with the claim adjuster all questions concerning the fairness of the settlement, in view of the legal rights of the
injured, were referred 'to, and determined by, the "chaser." In quite
a number of instances it was disclosed that the injured person regarded
the layman solicitor as "the lawyer in the case," and so referred to
him, although it did not appear that the solicitor had in any affirmative
way represented himself as a lawyer.
On the other hand situations were presented wherein it appeared that
claim adjusters for prospective defendants informed injured parties concerning their rights in such a manner as to have them believe 'that their
cases lacked legal merit and that they had no cause of action.
Wherever there is present a fiduciary relationship which, because of
the existing circumstances, is naturally regarded by the injured person as that of attorney and client, there is a subtle encroachment upon
the functions involved in the term "the practice of law."
There has been some disagreement (in the absence of a statutory
definition) as to what specific acts come within the fair scope of the
term "the practice of law" under modern -conditions. But in addition
to the prosecution and defense of causes in the courts, it is generally
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agreed that rendering advice to a client as to his legal rights and du2
ties is clearly within the peculiar province of the legal profession.
At the time of the filing of the first report of the Circuit Court, in
the inquiry above referred toi3 on May 24, 1927, certain legislative recommendations were made. Among them was: "(5)-A law to broaden
and strengthen the present statute prohibiting the practice of law without a license." The Wisconsin Statute at the time was Sec. 256.30,
which makes it an offense for any person to practice as an attorney in
any court of record.
The next section, 256.31, provides that "No person shall in any manner hold himself out as an attorney," etc., or represent himself as authorized to practice law, unless licensed. It provides that the use of the
words "attorney at law, lawyer," etc. or equivalent words, by any person in connection with his own name, or any sign, advertisement, card,
etc., the evident purpose of which is -to induce others to believe such
person to be regularly licensed to practice law in the courts, is a holding out within the meaning of the section.
The 1927 legislature made no ohange in Sec. 256.30, which refers to
practice "in a court of record" but added a sentence to Sec. 256.31 as
follows: "Every person whose business it is for fee or reward to
prosecute or defend causes in any court of record ....or give advice
in relation to causes or matters therein pending, shall be deemed to be
holding himself out as an attorney within the meaning of -this section."
Section 346.49 was also amended to the effect that any one falsely
assuming or pretending to be (among other officers named) an attorney
at law, and "shall take -upon himself to act as such ..... whereby another is injured or defrauded ..... shall be punished," etc.
Though not strictly pertinent to the subject, it may 'be observed in
this connection that common barratry at common law is "the offense
of frequently exciting and stirring up quarrels and suits, either at law
or otherwise." 4 But by Ch. 400, Laws of 1927, common barratry was
defined as "the practice of soliciting, maintaining, or exciting judicial
'5
proceedings or other actions at law or equity."
Chapter 457 of the Laws of 1927 (256.29) declares it ground for disbarment for an attorney "to stir up strife and litigation; or to hunt up
causes of action and inform thereof, in order to be employed to bring
suit, or to breed litigation by seeking out those having claims for per231 Harvard Law Rev. p. 887. Re Duiwan (So. Car.) 24 L.R.A. n.s. 750, 753.
In re Bailey, 50 Mont. 365, 146 Pac. 1101, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 1198 and note; 2 R.C.L.
p. 938.
'In re Petition of Churchill, supra.
'7 CJ. "Barratry" Sec. 1 p. 925; 4 Bla. Coin. 134.
'Sec. 348.325 Wis. Statutes.
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sonal injuries, etc., or to employ agents and runners." A contract of
employment made in violation of this section is void as to the attorney.
This statute does not apply to the agents or runners themselves. The
1927 barratry statute does not apply to the stirring up of claims (not in
suit) by a layman, the word "quarrels" in the common law definition
having been eliminated. The statute relating to the unlicensed practice
of law does not apply to one who practices law other than in a court
of record. The statute defining what constitutes a "holding out" as an
attorney at law fails to include maiiy acts which clearly constitute the
practice of law; and the newly inserted provision concerning the giving of advice applies only to causes of action pending in any court of record.
So that if one, not an attorney, habitually stirs up strife or quarrels
or claims, without actually exciting a judicial proceeding or action, he
would not violate the present statute defining common barratry, unless
his pretenses constituted a mere subterfuge, and his real purpose was
to solicit a judicial proceeding or action; nor would he violate the statute
which forbids stirring up strife, or the solicitation of personal injury
claims (which applies only to lawyers.) If he practiced as an attorney,
but not in a court of record, and did not hold himself out as an attorney, although he performed acts which actually constitute the practice of law, such as the giving of legal advice, but did not do so in relation to causes or matters pending in a court of record, he would not
be violating the statute of this state forbidding unlicensed practice'; nor
would he be violating the "holding out" statute7 even as amended by
Ch. 458, Laws of 1927. It will be seen that that amendment, in a measure, narrows rather than broadens the statute as to what constitutes a
"holding out" as an attorney.
Even the new statute'of Wisconsin" prohibiting fee splitting, applies
only to fees for professional services in an action or special proceeding.
A large portion of the professional work of the modern lawyer is
rendered within the confines of his law office. The Wisconsin statute,
seemingly, ignoring the changed conditions which the lawyer of today
must face, still clings substantially to the ancient function of the advocate arguing the cause of his client before a court of justice.
As contrasting with the Wisconsin statutes it is interesting to compare a few of the laws of other states which I have had opportunity
to examine.
Sec. 256.30 Wis. Statutes.
Sec. 256-31 Wis. Statutes.
'Chap. 459, Laws of 1927, Sec. 256.45.
C

'31 Harvard Law Rev. p. 887.
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The Missouri statute is very broad. Among other things its prohibition against fee-splitting is much more comprehensive than ours.
It defines the terms "practice of law" and "law business" and prohibits
engaging in either without a license. Included in the definition of "law
business" is the advising, for a valuable consideration, of any person
as to any secular law, or the drawing of any instrument affecting secular rights, or the doing of any act tending to secure for any person
any property or rights. 10
The Oregon statute embodies in effect the statement concerning th"
"practice of law" which is contained in the opinion of Mr. Justice Clifford in the case of NationalSavings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S., *195, *199,
*200, which is: "Persons acting professionally in legal formalities, negotiations or proceedings by the warrant or authority of their clients may
be regarded as attorneys-at-law within the meaning of -that designation
as used in ,this country." The Court adds: "And all such, when they
undertake to .conduct legal controversies or transactions, profess themselves to be reasonably well acquainted with the law and the rules and
practice of the courts, and they are bound to exercise a reasonable degree of care, prudence, diligence, and skill. Authorities everywhere
support that proposition," etc.
The Michigan statute prohibits the practice of law or engaging in
the law business without a -license without defining the terms. It does
not limit the prohibition to counts of record."
The Mississippi statute likewise prohibits the practice of law without
a license although it contains some weaknesses similar to the Wiscon2

sin statute.'

In his recent book upon Legal Ethics Henry W. Jessup gives a concise and comprehensive definition which was approvingly quoted 'by
the Committee on Canons of Ethics in its report of the American Bar
Association at Buffalo in 1927: The consideration of the report was
deferred -until the 1928 meeting. That definition reads:
The practice of law is any service involving legal knowledge, whether
of representation, counsel, or advocacy, in or out of court, rendered in
respect of the rights, duties, obligations, liabilities, or business relations
of the one requesting the service.
"Laws Mo. 1915, p. 99-101, S.B. 275.
Mich. Judicature Act, 12066, Sec. 61.
Code of 1917, Sec. 207.

NOTE: On the general subject interesting statutes, much broader than the Wisconsin law, and particularly with reference to the practice of law by corporations,

will be found in the New York Penal Code, Sections 270, 277, 280; Mass. Statutes,
Ch. 221, Secs. 41, 46 and 47.
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This definition does not appear -to have been acted upon in the 1928
meeting.
Just where the line should be drawn in setting forth the acts or
services which constitute the practice of law may be quite difficult to
determine.
It was the view of the circuit judges who signed the report of May
28, 1928, filed in the Milwaukee special proceeding, that the Wisconsin statute ought to be broadened "so as to include professional legal
services customarily or regularly rendered even though there be no action pending.13
By way of amplification I would add my personal view, in order to
meet fair objections to -the perhaps too comprehensive Jessup definition, if proposed as a statutory enactment, -that there should be no
limitation to the effect that the services must be performed for fee or
reward, but that the limitation should apply only to the performance
of professional services as a regular occupation and not in isolated instances. There are many encroachments in the field of the practice of
law where no fee is charged for the legal advice offered or for the
drafting of papers. The absence of a fee charge has been held not to
remove the act from the field of law practice.14 Possibly there should
also be some exceptions such as the work of title-guaranty companies.l 5
The rather startling inadequacy of our present narrow statute obviously calls for some action.
It is believed, therefore, that the profession and the public generally, will be interested in the following suggested amendments of our
statutes:
That the language of Section 256.30 providing: "Any person who
shall practice as an attorney in any court of record without having first
obtained a license" etc., and providing a penalty, be amended so as to
read: "Any person who shall engage in the practice of law without
having first obtained a license" etc.
That Section 256.31 (the "holding out" statute above referred to)
be amended in one of the following forms:
(1) So as to read (in the parts material to this discussion),
. . . Every person whose business it is, for fee or reward or otherwise, to prosecute or defend causes in any court of record or other
judicial tribunal of the United States or of any of -the states, or customarily and as a part of his business, to render service involving legal
' Page 145 of Report of May 28, 1928.

"People v. Peoples Trust Co. 167 N.Y.S. 767.
'See
Ch. 221, See. 47 of the Mass. statute, and Sec. 280 of the New York
Penal Code.
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knowledge, whether of -representation, counsel, or advocacy, in or
out of court, whether for compensation or otherwise, in respect to the
rights, duties, obligations, liabilities, or business or domestic relations
of the one requesting the service, or to whom it is rendered, shall be
deemed to be holding himself out as an attorney, counselor, or lawyer,
within the meaning of this section .....
"
Or (2), by amending the 1927 amendment (quoted above, in part)
which limits the "holding out," in the cases specified, to one who prosecutes or defends causes in any court of record, etc., so as to read:
". ...

Every person whose business it is, whether for fee or reward

or otherwise, to prosecute or defend causes in any -court of record or
other judicial tribunal of -the United States or of any of .the states, or
to give legal advice or render professional legal -services, whether in
relation to causes or matters therein pending, or otherwise, shall be
deemed to be holding himself out as an attorney, counselor or lawyer
within the meaning of this section ....
"
These proposals are, of course, tentative, and are made in the above
form so as to create as little disturbance as possible of the theory underlying the two sections.
As between the first and second alternative proposals of amendment
of Section 256.31, I am inclined to favor the second alternative proposal. The first proposal is based on the Jessup definition (quoted
above) with some modifications. The second is briefer than the first,
is quite general in scope, and covers broadly the rendering of "professional legal services," the meaning of which I think can be safely left
to the courts.' 6
The second proposal makes the fewest changes in the present statute.
The words "whose business it is" in the second proposal, which words
are also contained in the present statute, will, I believe, exclude the isolated cases of the occasional drafting of a will or deed by a non-lawyer,
or the giving of legal advice in emergencies by laymen. The second
proposal includes the elements which the 1927 amendment omitted.
In dealing with lawyers-members of its bar-the court either possesses, or may invoke, certain summary powers to remedy and to discipline.17 For it is thus acting to protect its own household and to
discipline its own officers. It cannot proceed summarily against others. "The Court has no disciplinary supervision of business enterprises."' 18
But we find laymen who are engaged in some of the important funcSee National Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. *195 et seq.
1'2 R.C.L. p. 1026.

'

"Re Gray, 172 N.Y.S. 648.
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tions of the lawyer. In giving legal advice to those towards whom they
occupy a fiduciary relation they are engaged in the practice of law, as
that term is generally understood in the absence of statutory limitations. Notwithstanding the assumption of such a function they are
not bound by the statutory oath of an attorney, and they regard themselves as free from the ethical obligations of a lawyer. They venture
into the domains of an office which is "quasi-judicial." 19 But they nevertheless regard ,their dealing with human rights as but a "game." As
stated in one of the reports of the Milwaukee judges: "If the Canons
of Ethics are to be applicable to those practicing law we must have a
clear and comprehensive definition of what constitutes such practice,
otherwise we will have a hybrid class which cannot be subjected to
legal control or discipline. Where it is evident that one has assumed
the prerogative of a lawyer, ,he should be subject to the responsibilities
of the profession."
Speaking of the various encroachments on the practice of the law,
Mr. Julius Henry Cohen, the chairman of the Committee on Unlawful Practice of the Law of -the New York County Lawyers' Association, said at the Buffalo meeting of the American Bar Association:
Either we ought to repeal the Canons of Ethics entirely, or else we
ought -to insist that in the field of the practice of law lay agencies shall
stop ..... .I detect in movements hereabout an effort to break down
the constructive work that has been done for twenty or twenty-five years
by this association in the field of professional conduct, and if we do not
set our teeth firmly against this effort of laymen throughout the country to commercialize what is the practice of the law, we
20 shall find that we
have handicapped ourselves by our own standards.
"The -right to act as an attorney is a privilege of a personal nature,
not open to all, but limited to persons of good moral character, possessing special qualifications ascertained and certified after a long course
of study, both general and special."'"
There should be none who exercise that privilege who have not been
shown to possess the necessary qualifications; who are not subject to
the oath which every attorney is bound by; and who are not amenable
to the disciplinary power of the court. Many qualified men and women
in the legal profession are struggling to maintain themselves, their selfrespect, and the honor of their high calling. Not only in justice to
them, but in justice to the people of the state whose welfare demands
the very highest standard of conduct on the part of lawyers, these con'Langen v. Borkowski, 188 Wis. 277, 301; Hepp v. Petrie, 185 Wis. 350, 361;
Ellis v. Frawley, 165 Wis. 381.
* 1927 Report of A.B.A., pp. 107-108.
'In re Morse (Vt.) 36 A.L.R. 527; 2 R.C.L. p. 940.
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scientious practitioners should not be subjected to the temptations, nor
be obliged to meet -the improper competitive operations which emerge
from points of vantage just beyond the lines of the legal profession or
its Canons of Ethics.
The situation, as disclosed in the Milwaukee inquiry, called not only
for remedies respecting lawyers who were blind to the standards of
their profession. It called not only for remedies affecting actions and
proceedings pending in courts of record. It clearly demanded that
those who rendered services of a distinctly legal character, whether in
or out of court,.whether an action be pending or not, be alike subject
to such supervision and regulation as will make -the practice of law an
honorable service of man "by diligent study and true counsel of the
municipal law," and an "aid in solving the questions and guiding the
'22
business of society, according to the law."

'Quotation

is from address by Chief Justice Ryan.

